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Abstract 
This paper studies whether rationality can be computed. Rationality is defined as the use of 
complete information, which is processed with a perfect biological or physical brain, in an 
optimized fashion. To compute rationality one needs to quantify how complete is the 
information, how perfect is the physical or biological brain and how optimized is the entire 
decision making system. Rationality of a model (i.e. physical or biological brain) is measured 
by the expected accuracy of the model. Rationality of the optimization procedure is measured 
as the ratio of the achieved objective (i.e. utility) to the global objective. The overall rationality 
of a decision is measured as the product of the rationality of the model and the rationality of 
the optimization procedure. The conclusion reached is that rationality can be computed for 
convex optimization problems. 
Introduction 
Rationality is one of those elusive concepts that philosophers have invented. Simply put, to be 
rational is to be logical (Anand, 1993; Marwala, 2018a). But this linguistic explanation of 
rationality is inadequate. The more complete definition of being rational is to analyze or reach 
a conclusion (e.g. decision) by using all the information available and processing such 
information in an optimized manner. The challenge is how about if the information is 
incomplete? What if the information processing engine is less than perfect? How about if it is 
not possible to process such information? What is the difference between the biological and 
physical brains? The biological brain is the natural brain such as a human brain whereas the 
physical brain is the artificial brain such as artificial neural network, which is a type of artificial 
intelligence (AI). Herbert Simon coined these limitations of information, brain and 
optimization bounded rationality (Simon, 1982). Bounded rationality simply means limited 
rationality. If rationality can be limited, can we compute the extent of this limitation? Marwala 
(2018a) asked whether the physical brain, such as AI, is rational and concluded that even 
though the physical brain is not rational, advances in technology developments make it more 
rational, and that it is more rational than the biological brain. Comparing physical to biological 
brain evokes the question of whether it is possible to compute or measure rationality. In order 
to answer the question of the quantification of rationality, it is important to break rationality 
into its three components, and these are information, information processing engine (physical 
or biological brain) and optimization. Then we can investigate if rationality of each of these 
components can be computed. Then if rationality of these components can be computed, how 
these quantifications can be aggregated to form a composite estimation of rationality. This 
approach of looking at the components of decision making nodes and evaluating their 
rationality is called the procedural way of evaluating rationality. The other way of calculating 
rationality is the substantive method, where the outcome of the decision making process is 
evaluated and based on its performance, the extent of rationality is estimated. Herbert Simon 
describes these as procedural and substantive rationality (Simon, 1976). 
Information 
Rational decisions are based on relevant information. If one uses irrelevant information to make 
a decision then one is being irrational. Superstition is the practice of using irrelevant 
information to make a decision or draw a conclusion. For example, there was a belief that if 
one encounters a black cat crossing the road then this was an indication of bad luck (Marwala, 
2014). The other superstition is that if one hears an owl hooting then one will have death in 
his/her family. Of course neither does the hoot of an owl has anything to do with death nor 
does the crossing of the black cat has anything to do with bad luck. All these are conclusions 
that are derived based on irrelevant information and thus are irrational. It turns out that human 
beings are not rational beings (Kahneman, 2011). Ruling out rationality based on irrelevant 
information is easy. There are two reasons why relevant information can truncate rationality 
and these are either the information is incomplete or it is imperfect (Marwala, 2009). Complete 
information is very difficult to obtain but can be accessed for very simple problems. For some 
classes of problems, incomplete information can be estimated. Artificial intelligence has been 
successfully used to estimate missing data (Marwala, 2009; Marwala, 2019). AI is a 
computational technique, which is used to make machines intelligent, and has been 
successfully used in engineering problems (Marwala, 2010, 2012 & 2018b), to predict 
interstate conflict (Marwala and Lagazio, 2011), to model financial markets (Marwala, 2013; 
Marwala and Hurwitz, 2017) and to model rationality (Marwala, 2014 & 2015). The difficulty 
with imperfect information is that very often one cannot determine how imperfect the 
information is. As a result it is difficult to establish the impact of imperfect information on the 
rationality of a decision that is taken. 
Model: Biological and Physical Brain 
To quantify how rational the decision is, relevance, degrees of completeness and perfection of 
information as well as the effectiveness of a decision making machine, whether a biological or 
physical brain, are taken into account. This is a difficult route to take and thus will be difficult 
to quantify rationality. The other way of quantifying rationality is by evaluating the 
effectiveness of the decision machine made. The information that is collected is processed by 
some device in order to make a rational decision. The idea of predicting the future in decision 
making is important otherwise the decision will be random. For humans such a device is the 
brain and for machines it is based on artificial intelligence. The human brain takes the input 
information and process it. It has been observed that humans are irrational beings and, 
therefore, it is not easy to quantify their degree of rationality (accuracy) in advance. For AI 
machines, they are trained and validated using statistical procedures and one is able to estimate 
their expected effectiveness from the validation data. This accuracy level is linked to the 
rationality of the AI machine. The more accurate the AI machine, the more rational it is. There 
are methods that have been advanced to improve the accuracy or rationality of the AI machines. 
One of these is that the model shouldn’t be complex. This is what is called the Occam’s razor 
and is named after William of Occam (Adams, 1987; Keele, 2010).  Occam’s razor simply says 
that the simplest model that explains all observations is the one that has the highest probability 
of being correct. Of course the correctness of the model is a contentious issue because George 
Box famously declared that “all models are wrong” (Box, 1976). What he meant was that 
models are nothing but estimation of reality and they are not reality. If we are to take George 
Box’s conclusion to its rational conclusion then all models are not fully rational, which is the 
conclusion that was reached by Herbert Simon. In essence George Box’s ‘all models are 
wrong” is a statistical version of Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded rationality. The degree of 
rationality of models given the information that is fed into these models can be estimated by 
how accurate these models are.  
What about the Uncertainty Principle? 
At the turn of the previous century Max Planck came up with the quantum theory (Planck, 
1900). On trying to mathematically model the black body radiation problem, he realized that if 
he assumed that energy was in the form of packets called quanta then the model is able to 
predict measurements accurately. At first he thought it was just a mathematical trick. Albert 
Einstein used this mathematical trick to explain the photoelectric effect and this is the work for 
which he was awarded the Nobel Prize (Einstein, 1905). Then it became clear that the quantum 
theory is not just a mathematical trick that explains the black body radiation problem but it also 
explains the photoelectric effect. Later on Werner Heisenberg observed that because of the 
theory of quantum mechanics one cannot know the position and the velocity of an electron at 
the same time (Heisenberg, 1927). If one knows the velocity of the electron then one does not 
know its position and vice versa. This is what is called the Heisenberg uncertainty principle 
and it is not because of the effects of measurements but it is the fundamental law of quantum 
mechanics. Albert Einstein was so impressed with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle that he 
nominated Heisenberg for a Nobel Prize. A similar concept exists in the interplay between the 
model accuracy and the number of input variables. If one uses too few variables to create a 
model, then the model will not be rational, i.e. accurate, enough. If one uses too many variables 
to create the model, the model will be too complex and because of Occam’s razor principle, it 
will be too complex, thereby, compromising the rationality of the model (Franklin, 2001). The 
concept of using too many variables in the model is called the curse of dimensionality 
(Bellman, 1957 & 1961). This interplay between rationality, model complexity and the curse 
of dimensionality is one of the reasons why models are always rationally bounded.  
Optimization 
Given the fact that we have related accuracy of models to rationality another element of 
rationality is whether the process of using information to build the models is efficient. One way 
of achieving that efficiency is through optimization. Why is optimization important in 
rationality? Suppose Denga wants to fly from New York to Los Angeles and she decides to fly 
from New York to Tokyo to Los Angeles for no other reason except that she wanted to move 
from New York to Los Angeles. We will characterizing this move as irrational. Travelling from 
New York to Los Angeles directly is more rational than travelling from New York to Tokyo to 
Los Angeles ceteris paribus1. The direct New York to Los Angeles trip is more optimized than 
the New York-Tokyo-Los Angeles trip. So optimization is important for rationality. When AI 
machines are used, the optimization process includes two aspects and these are computational 
efficiency and model accuracy. To optimize both processing effort and model accuracy is 
known as multi-objective optimization (Miettinen, 1999). In multi-objective optimization the 
                                                          
1 Other things equal 
weights given to processing effort and model accuracy are subjective. For each weights given 
to these objective functions, i.e. processing effort and model accuracy, there is an optimal 
solution. The combination of these optimal solutions, given different weights of processing 
effort and model accuracy, forms the Pareto optimal frontier (Pareto, 1897; Mathur, 1991). 
There is no solution on the Pareto optimal frontier which is the true maximum solution. The 
second difficulty with optimization is that it is not clear whether an optimal solution is the 
global optimum solution. In the theory of optimization there are two types of problems and 
these are convex and non-convex problems (Borwein and Lewis, 2000). Convex problems are 
those where one is guaranteed to identify a global optimum solution whereas the non-convex 
problems are those where one is not guaranteed an optimal solution. Now how does one 
quantify rationality given information, model and optimization process as well as the multi-
objective nature of the problem, which is subjective? Does this imply that there is an element 
of subjectivity in the quantification of rationality? For convex problems, the accuracy of the 
model is adequate to quantify rationality. For non-convex problems rationality is subjective. 
The way to quantify rationality in the optimization process is to estimate the ratio between the 
achieved objective and the global objective. This means if we cannot identify the global 
optimum objective then it is not possible to quantify the rationality of the optimization 
procedure. This means only convex problems, where the global objective is identifiable, can 
we be able to quantify rationality.    
Classification of Rationality 
One of the steps that has been taken is the idea of classifying the extent of rationality. In the 
financial markets customers exchange goods and services and the price of this exchange is 
driven by the laws of demand and supply (Stringham and Curott, 2015). One such markets is 
the stock exchange where investors buy stocks from companies at prices determined by the 
laws of demand and supply. Nobel Laureate Eugene Fama studied market efficiency and came 
up with the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1965). The efficient market hypothesis claims 
that markets are efficient but this proposition has been proven not to be universally correct. 
There is a relationship between efficiency and rationality. Efficient markets are rational and 
inefficient markets are not fully rational. In financial sciences, there are three ways of 
classifying efficiency of markets and these are strong, semi-strong and weak forms of market 
efficiency (Fama, 1996 & 2008). The weak form of market efficiency uses publicly available 
information to price the financial assets. The semi-strong market efficiency claims that prices 
reflect publicly available information and are able to quickly adapt to new information. The 
strong market efficiency claims that prices reflect both hidden and publicly available 
information. If we use the linkage between rationality and efficiency, then the strong market 
efficiency implies strong rational markets, semi-strong efficiency implies semi-strong market 
rationality and weak market efficiency implies weak rational markets. This of course is the 
quantification of rationality of the markets. Market efficiency assumes what is called the theory 
of rational expectations, which prescribes that agents reflect all the information that is available 
and, therefore, cannot be consistently wrong on predicting the future, a task that AI models are 
good at (Muth, 1961). This way of classifying rationality based on the efficient market 
hypothesis implies that only information and agents that predict the future are important in 
determining market rationality. However, we have observed that the uncertainty principle 
between information and prediction agents (i.e. the model) as well as the optimization of the 
whole functioning of the markets are important in the quantification of rationality of the 
markets.   
Rationality Quantification 
As described above rational decision making uses complete information and a model to make 
an optimized decision. Rationality of a decision is based on rationality of the model as 
measured by its accuracy as well as rationality of the optimization procedure, which is 
quantified by the ratio of the achieved objective to the global objective. The global objective 
is only attainable for convex problems. The overall rationality of a decision can be calculated 
as the product of the rationality of the model and the rationality of the optimization procedure. 
This, therefore, means that rationality can be computed provided the problem in question is a 
convex problem. 
Conclusion 
This paper attempted to answer the question on whether rationality can be quantified. On 
answering this question we considered a model which takes information and makes a decision. 
We concluded that the measure of the rationality of the model depends on how accurate the 
model is. The accuracy of this model depends on the completeness and the degree of perfection 
of the information as well as the uncertainty principle interplay between the model and 
information. There is an added dimension to the rationality of the process, which is that the 
whole process should be globally optimized. This situation can only be guaranteed for convex 
problems. The rationality of the optimization procedure is measured as the ratio of the achieved 
objective to the global objective. The overall rationality of a decision is measured as the product 
of the rationality of the model and the rationality of the optimization procedure.  The conclusion 
is, therefore, that rationality can be computed for convex optimization problems.   
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